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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
IMMUNITY AGREEMENT-A BAR TO PROSECUTION
The defendant was indicted for first degree murder and entered
a plea of not guilty. He filed a motion to quash the indictment, alleging
that he had entered into an immunity agreement with the assistant state
attorney. The substance of the agreement was that the defendant would
not be prosecuted if a polygraph examination indicated that he was telling
the truth in denying his guilt. If the results showed that the defendant
was guilty, then he would plead guilty to manslaughter, and if the test
was inconclusive neither party would be bound. The polygraph operator
concluded that the defendant was innocent.' Upon hearing the motion
the trial court quashed the indictment, whereupon the state appealed to
the Second District Court of Appeal. On review, held, affirmed: a court
approved agreement not to prosecute a professedly innocent defendant
is a pledge of public faith and is binding and enforceable upon the state.
State v. Davis, 188 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
The widely held opinion that prosecutors never bargain is a
myth. As a practical matter they must in order to stay in
business.'
Agreements not to prosecute occur quite frequently today.3 The
matter is seldom questioned in the courts because both sides are usually
satisfied with and fulfill their part of the agreement. In bargaining the
state avoids a protracted and expensive trial as well as the uncertainty
of a jury verdict;4 the defendant in turn receives a lesser punishment or
no punishment at all. This note will show the effect of immunity agree-
ments as a bar to prosecution.
Over the years the enforcement of agreements not to prosecute has
been recognized in varying forms. In 1878, in the Whiskey Cases,' the
district attorney acted without authority in granting immunity from
prosecution to an accomplice in consideration for his testimony against
his associate. The agreement was held not to be a legal bar or defense
to a later prosecution against the accomplice for the offense to which he
1. It was the opinion of the polygraph operator that the defendant was telling the
truth. Subsequently he changed his belief after conferring with another polygraph operator
who was of the opinion that the test results were inconclusive. Thus, he was in fact
accepting another person's opinion in lieu of his own. The court concluded that the polygraph
test was to be given by a person selected by the parties. Since the first polygraph operator
was the agreed upon person, his opinion before it was subsequently changed should control.
2. Polstein, How to "Settle" a Criminal Case, 8 PRAC. LAW. 35, 37 (1962).
3. Courts are tending to recognize that such plea bargaining does in fact take place.
See, e.g., United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Anderson v. North
Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963); Lowe v. State, 111 Md. 1, 73 A. 637 (1909).
See also, Comment, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises By Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
4. Anderson v. North Carolina, 221 F. Supp. 930 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
5. 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
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testified.0 At most the agreement gave the defendant an equitable right
to pardon.
7
It is commonly held that where a prosecuting attorney promises a
defendant immunity to some or all criminal charges his promise will not
bind the state unless the agreement has court approval. Some jurisdictions
have taken the view that even with court approval such a promise will
be of no avail because the prosecuting attorney exceeded his authority.'
Where immunity agreements are broken by the prosecution, some
courts indirectly enforce them by the grant of minimum or suspended
sentences, together with recommendations for pardon."' Thus, the full
force and effect of a conviction by the state may be in fact almost a nullity.
Often a prosecuting attorney will enter into an agreement with a
defendant providing that he will not be prosecuted for the same offense
if he makes a full disclosure of the crime and testifies thereto. As previously
noted, such agreements, if made without court consent, have generally
been held to be of no effect in affording protection to the defendant if he
is later placed on trial for the crime for which he had received immunity.1
This is done in spite of the recognition that it is often necessary for the
state to resort to the testimony of criminals themselves for the detection
and punishment of crime.' 2
Whether court approval is necessary to make the agreement binding
and enforceable is, in some jurisdictions, dependent on whether the prose-
cuting attorney has the statutory or case law authority to enter a nolle
prosequi without court consent. Generally, courts are quite lenient in
stretching the facts to find judicial approval. However, even where court
consent is absent, none may be necessary to give effect to the agreement. 3
6. See note 15 infra for cases where the agreement is a bar to a subsequent prosecution.
7. See cases cited note 14 infra.
8. See, e.g., State v. Keep, 85 Ore. 265, 166 P. 936 (1917) ; Ingraham v. Prescott, 111
Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933).
9. People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 P. 1033 (1923); State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn.
302, 207 N.W. 646 (1926).
10. See cases cited note 14 infra.
11. 99 U.S. 594 (1878) ; Ingraham v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320, 149 So. 369 (1933);
State v. Guild, 149 Mo. 370, 50 S.W. 909 (1899).
12. In Ingram v. Prescott, 111 Fla. 320, 321, 149 So. 369 (1933), the supreme court
realized this when it stated:
From the earliest times, it has been found necessary, for the detection and
punishment of crime, for the state to resort to the criminals themselves for testimony
with which to convict their confederates in crime. While such a course offers a
premium to treachery, and sometimes permits the more guilty to escape, it tends
to prevent and break up combinations, by making criminals suspicious of each
other, and it often leads to the punishment of guilty persons who would otherwise
escape. Therefore, on the ground of public policy, it has been uniformly held that
a state may contract with a criminal for his exemption from prosecution if he
shall honestly and fairly make a full disclosure of the crime, whether the party
testified against is convicted or not.
13. Thus, in Florida, although the court in the instant case did not decide the issue,
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The majority of jurisdictions which have been faced with the problem
of enforceability of immunity agreements have refused to sanction them
as a bar to prosecution regardless of whether court approval has been
obtained; instead, they give the defendant an equitable right to clemency. 4
The few jurisdictions which do uphold the validity of court approved
immunity agreements as a bar to prosecution require that the accused
fulfill his part of the bargain.' 5 It is an open question whether even these
minority jurisdictions will sanction wholly extrajudicial agreements as a
bar to prosecution.
In the instant case the agreement was dependent upon the outcome
of a polygraph examination given to the defendant who had steadfastly
professed his innocence. The court considered this professed innocence
important in distinguishing this case from others where immunity promised
an admittedly guilty criminal does not act as a bar to prosecution. The
agreement here was treated as a "pledge of the public faith-a promise
made by state officials-and one that should not be lightly disregarded." 6
In this writer's opinion the agreement as a bar to prosecution was in
the best interest of justice and was desirable on the ground of public
policy. Furthermore, the defendant was entitled to have the bargain
enforced as there was evidence of court approval.' The decision seems
to place Florida in the growing minority of jurisdictions which recognize
that court approved immunity agreements are binding upon the state. 8
Hopefully, this case means that in the future all agreements not to prose-
cute, whether court approved or not, will be enforced. In upholding the
validity of immunity agreements extended to professedly innocent de-
fendants the bar to prosecution is the only equitable solution. Florida has
thereby shown progress in the administration of its judicial system. Hence-
forth, state prosecutors, aware that their agreements may be enforced,
court approval may not be necessary to make the agreement valid. In the case of
Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So.2d 857, 859 (Fla. 1956), the court stated:
There can be no doubt that under the common law the Prosecuting Attorney
controlled the entry of a nolle prosequi, up to the time that the jury is sworn to
try the cause. . . .Under the common law of England prosecution in criminal
cases were controlled by the Attorney General and he alone had the exclusive
discretion to decide whether prosecution should be discontinued prior to the
inception of jeopardy. In the absence of statute, the common law continues to
be in force in most states of this country. Florida has adopted no statute on the
subject. (Emphasis added.)
14. 99 U.S. 594 (1878); People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 P. 1033 (1923);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 S.W.2d 724 (Ky. 1951); State v. Kiewel, 166 Minn. 302,
207 N.W. 646 (1926); State v. Guild, 149 Mo. 370, 50 S.W. 909 (1899); State v. Keep, 85
Ore. 265, 166 P. 936 (1917).
15. See People v. Bogolowski, 326 Ill. 253, 157 N.E. 181 (1927) ; State v. Hingle,
242 La. 844, 139 So.2d 205 (1962); State v. Ashby, 43 N.J. 273, 204 A.2d 1 (1964);
Camron v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 180, 22 S.W. 682 (1893); State v. Ward, 112 W. Va. 552,
165 S.E. 803 (1932).
16. 188 So.2d 24, 27 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
17. Id. at 28.
18. See cases cited note 15 supra.
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will carefully scrutinize the situations wherein a compromise is advanta-
geous. The public in general, and defendants in criminal cases in particular,
must be able to trust in the American system of justice if it is to survive.
DAVm HECHT
THE APPEALING JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S RIGHT
TO INTEREST
The plaintiff obtained a 15,000 dollar judgment. Believing the
verdict inadequate, he appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal.
The judgment was affirmed and a petition for rehearing denied.' There-
upon the defendant tendered payment of the judgment, without including
the interest that had accrued since the date of the original judgement. The
plaintiff refused the tender and unsuccessfully petitioned for writs of
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida and the Supreme Court of the
United States.' Upon conclusion of the proceedings in the United States
Supreme Court, the defendant again tendered payment of the judgment
without interest. The plaintiff again refused the tender and filed a motion
with the trial court to compel the defendant to pay the principal with
interest from the date of the original judgment, claiming that both
tenders without interest were invalid. Upon hearing the motion, the trial
court ordered the defendant to pay interest only from the date of judgment
to the date of initial tender. On appeal by the plaintiff, held, reversed and
remanded: A tender of payment by a judgment debtor to an appealing
judgment creditor is an insufficient tender where the accrued interest from
the date of the original judgment is not included in the tender. Stager v.
Florida E. Coast Ry., 189 So.2d 192 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
In the absence of a statute8 the common law rule4 is that judgments
do not bear interest. Courts that grant interest without statutory authori-
zation generally do so because the judgment debtor has caused a delay
in the proceedings.' The right to interest on judgments has been estab-
lished by statute in most jurisdictions.' Under the typical statute interest
1. Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 163 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
2. Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 382 U.S. 878 (1965) ; Stager v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
174 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1965).
3. See generally Note, Interest on Verdicts and Judgements in State and Federal Courts,
38 NoTRB DAME LAW. 58 (1962); 47 C.J.S. Interest § 21 (1946).
4. E.g., D'Amico v. Cariglia, 330 Mass. 246, 112 N.E.2d 807 (1953); Coulter v. Gen.
Fireprooffing Co., 67 Ohio App. 71, 35 N.E.2d 1003 (1941); Export Leaf Tobacco Co. v.
City of Richmond, 163 Va. 145, 175 S.E. 753 (1934).
5. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Bixler, 350 Mich. 688, 87 N.W.2d 174 (1957), where the court
penalized a party for causing an unnecessary appeal; Hilton v. State, 60 Neb. 421, 83 N.W.
354 (1900) and Clinton v. Gant, 337 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1960), where the party against whom
the verdict was rendered caused delay. See generally Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 495 (1945).
6. Nilsson v. State Personnel Bd., 36 Cal. App. 2d 186, 97 P.2d 843 (1939) ; Hemstock
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